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T HE fairies that presided over Benjamin N. Cardozo's birth
were not wholly benign. But they endowed him with one
gift of grace far more significant than his rare talents of mind.
He was given a contagious goodness which brought to life the
goodness in others. In no invidious sense was the New York
Court of Appeals, especially during his presidency, Cardozo's
court. And the compulsions of Cardozo's spirit upon those with
whom he labored were revealed even through the austerity which
insulates the Supreme Court from public knowledge of its intimate
life. It is not surprising that the persuasiveness of his personality
subdued his immediate environment by its sheer unconscious radi-
ations. It is astonishing that so cloistered a spirit should have.
attained such a hold on popular feeling.
Other judges have had much more influence upon the governing
forces of American society than fell to Cardozo's lot. Perhaps a
few, but at best a very few, judges had as keen an insight into the
peculiar rele of the judge in the American scheme. Finally, there
was one judge of greater originality and deeper penetration into
the intellectual presuppositions of the judicial process. For it
was not merely the language of playful deference which made
Cardozo always speak of Holmes as "the Master." But the his-
tory of the Supreme Court affords no analogue to the unanimity of
lay as well as professional opinion that Chief Judge Cardozo was
the one man adequate to fill the historic place vacated by Holmes;
nor is there a parallel to the deep feeling of the country as a whole
that the death of Cardozo was not merely the premature termina-
tion of a distinguished judicial career, but the end of the living
energy of one of the most powerful moral resources of the nation.
Ordinarily observations like these are properly uncongenial to
pages concerned with the discussion of juristic problems. But in
the case of Cardozo the main path to his views on public law leads
from his character. His conception of the Constitution cannot be
* In connection with this article, I am under happy obligation to my learned
friend Edward F. Prichard, Jr.
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severed from his conception of a judge's function in applying it.
His views of the judge's function derive from his convictions on
philosophic issues which implicate the workings of the judicial
mind. Such issues in turn involve a man's notions of his relation
to the universe. These are abstractions. They seem far removed,
let us say, from No. i8o of the October Term, 1936. But the clar-
iy with which a specific controversy is seen in the context of the
larger intellectual issues beneath the formal surface of litigation,
and the courage with which such analysis infuses decision and
opinion are the ultimate determinants of American public law.
I
That the task of constitutional construction is a function not of
mechanics but of imponderables is now known even by Macau-
lay's omniscient schoolboy. There is, however, no authorized
catalogue of the imponderables; still less is there an accepted
organon for striking the balance among competing and conflicting
values. Partly because of the wise common-law tradition of ad
hoc adjudication, partly because of the distinctive temperament
and experience of judges, an avowed juristic philosophy of which
individual decisions are particular expressions seldom emerges
from the opinions of a judge. The formulation of such a philos-
ophy before a judge ascends the Supreme Bench is a still rarer
phenomenon. Barring only Holmes, no man had so completely
revealed the map of his mind before he went on the Court as had
Cardozo. If surprise there was in anything that he wrote as a
Justice, it was not for want of disclosure by him as to the way he
looked at questions that would come before him.
Ultimately, a particular decision in a realm not obviously fore-
closed by authority I - the decisive field for the play of a judge's
creative powers - is the exercise of a high art, what in the happier
phraseology of the Seventeenth Century was called a " mystery."
But it is a most subtle and complicated art, at its best the end of
1 .. . the radiating potencies of a decision may go beyond the actual hold-
ing. ... An opinion may be so framed that there is doubt whether the part of it
invoked as an authority is to be ranked as a definitive holding or merely a conddered
dictum." Hawkes v. Hamill, 283 U. S. 52, 5S-59 (x933). See Llewellyn, The Rule
of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1243.
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a long ratiocinative process. Scientific discoveries, we are told,
come to the prepared mind. So the art of adjudication is most im-
aginatively exercised by those judges who know that the ultimate
determination of values is not within the power of formula or
measurement. Therefore they explore to the uttermost the ra-
tional foundations of what they affirm and what they reject, in
order to avoid confusion between their private universe and th
universe. All of Cardozo's extrajudicial writings, but more par-
ticularly The Nature of the Judicial Process and The Paradoxes
of Legal Science are suffused with intimations of what later came
from his pen as a Justice, as well as glosses upon what is so shyly
expressed in opinions. But his lectures on The Methods of His-
tory, Tradition and Sociology,2 The Judge as a Legislator a and
Liberty and Government 4 convey explicit analysis of the nature
of the issues which cases frame in deceptively logical form. They
also reveal the extent of the freedom which judges have in dealing
with these issues, as well as the limits of that freedom.
Whereas Holmes all his life was much more occupied with his
first love, philosophy, than was Cardozo, he never formulated his
philosophy as systematically as did Cardozo except in a short es-
say or two.' Indeed, while Holmes was a conscientious student
of all the great systems of philosophy and reread such disparate
thinkers as Spinoza and John Dewey again and again, he dis-
trusted system, and inclined to the view that systems are apt to
be merely the elegant elaborations of a few profound insights.
On the other hand, Holmes often made his opinions the vehicles of
his philosophic beliefs. He summarized his own views as to ulti-
mates in the amber of his apothegms. While he was alert to
the dangers of what the shrewd Lincoln called "pernicious ab-
stractions," particularly in the business of judging, the flair of his
mind was for abstractions. Thus it is that from his opinions may
be culled sentences which convey his vision of the Constitution in
2 TnE NATURE Or THE JuaiuL PROCESS (ig2i) Lecture 11.
3 Id., Lecture III.
4 Chapters 3 and 4 in THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SciErce (1928).
55 See The Path of the Law and Law in Science and Science in Law in HoLmES.
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920).
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its relation to the organic process of human society and his con-
ception of the judge as a custodian of that vision.
With Cardozo it was otherwise. Perhaps because he had
spelled out his philosophic beliefs and directions in his trilogy,'
his opinions stuck close to the circumstance of the particular rec-
ord and indulged sparingly in detachable epigrammatic utterance.
But the specific inevitably implicates the general, and in a few in-
stances Cardozo expressed the underlying principles that guided
his constitutional function in language and accent not confined to
the iminediacies of the case.
Indeed the only scope for originality in elucidating the process
of constitutional adjudication is the power of putting old truths
with freshness. In the abstract, the appropriate ways of looking at
the Constitution, when brought within the focus of the judiciary,
have been stated in essentially similar terms since Marshall first
intoned them in the solemn rhetoric of his day. The sanctions of
statesmanship which vindicate this viewpoint were stated with the
finality of exquisite scholarship by James Bradley Thayer nearly
fifty years ago.' Nor have the intermittent deviations in the ap-
plications of Marshall's canons and Thayer's philosophy ever
explicitly challenged either canons or philosophy. That the Con-
stitution contains within itself the formulated past but was also
designed for the unfolding future; that it is a source of govern-
mental energy no less than of governmental restriction; that in the
most difficult areas of adjudication the issues which come before the
Court do not primarily present questions as to the meaning of
words but invite judgment upon ultimate issues of society which
in the now classic language of Mr. Justice Holmes "must be con-
sidered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that
of what was said a hundred years ago " _ these are generalities
to which fealty is never denied.
6 THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); TnE GRwTr OF THE Lw
(1924) ; Tim PARADOxES or LEGAL ScIExcE (1928).
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law (1S93)
7 HAv. L. Rv. 129, reprinted in THAYER, LEAL Esscws (igoS) i; see Frankfurter
and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, z935 and 1936
(1938) 5I HA.Rv. L. REV. 577, 620-37.
s A.issouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 46,433 (1920).
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But the recognition of their relevance to a specific controversy
and the fidelity with which they are applied are the turning points
of decisions. Difference among judges is not in knowledge of con-
stitutional precepts but in the persistence and insight with which
they respect them. Normally, the raw materials of public law con-
troversies are contemporary affairs, and understanding of their
significance is seldom achieved on the bench without considerable
prior immersion in affairs. Cardozo is a striking exception. The
market place was not his milieu. Sociological problems were not
the preoccupation of his leisure moments, his spontaneous writ-
ings, or his talk. Like Holmes, he was sensitive to social tensions
and the conflicts of interest not by the bent of his mind, but be-
cause the scholar in him made him realize that to be a good judge
he had to become conversant with the processes of government
and of industry.
Cardozo realized the essentially empiric character of govern-
ment and the range of discretion implied by its activities. "Time
with its tides," he was aware, "brings new conditions which must
be cared for by new laws." The need for legislation, its scope and
limits, " in last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide mar-
gin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in cases of plain
abuse will there be revision by the courts." ' But review of an-
other's right to exercise policy without substituting one's own pre-
sents the most treacherous judicial difficulties. For it necessitates
extraordinary powers of detachment not to confound personal dis-
approval with an enduring constitutional prohibition, not to trans-
late doubts as to wisdom into judgments of law. It implies the
rarest gifts of tolerance and a respect for much that is not fully
understood. Cardozo recognized that new policies must be per-
fected or discarded by the test of experience, and must not be
judged as though the legislature were a modern Minerva. Except
9 Williams v. Mayor, 289 U. S. 36, 46 (i933). See also the observations made
more than ioo years ago by William Johnson, one of the ablest members of the
Court: "The science of government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if, indeed,
that can be called a science which has but few fixed principles, and practically con-
sists in little more than the exercise of a sound discretion, applied to the exigencies
of the state as they arise. It is the science of experiment." Anderson v. Dunn, 6
Wheat. 204, 226 (U. S. 1822).
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in the limited instances where explicit constitutional restrictions
fence in legislative freedom, laws justify themselves before courts
if they manifest
"a pursuit of legitimate ends by methods honestly conceived and ration-
ally chosen. More will not be asked by those who have learned from
experience and history that government is at best a makeshift, that the
attainment of one good may involve the sacrifice of others, and that
compromise will be inevitable until the coming of Utopia." 10
Taxation is the most sensitive area of contemporary govern-
ment, but the intellectual perspective in which Cardozo placed tax
measures induced by social rather than fiscal motives was expres-
sive of his general attitude toward the diverse manifestations of
the modern state:
"Systems of taxation are not framed, nor is it possible to frame them,
with perfect distribution of benefit and burden. Their authors must be
satisfied with a rough and ready form of justice. This is true in special
measure while the workings of a novel method are untested by a rich
experience. There must be advance by trial and error. . . . In dis-
carding as arbitrary symbols the lines that it [the legislature] has
chosen, there is danger of forgetting that in social and economic life the
grooves of thought and action are not always those of logic, and that sym-
bols may mean as much as conduct has put into them." "
Since language is the sword by which the judiciary intervenes
in the legislative process, those who wield it must be unremittingly
on guard against its hazards:
"A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny
of labels. Out of the vague precepts of the Fourteenth Amendment a
court frames a rule which is general in form, though it has been vrought
under the pressure of particular situations. Forthwith another situation
is placed under the rule because it is fitted to the words, though related
faintly, if at all, to the reasons that brought the rule into existence." 12
10 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 577 (1935) (dissenting).
" Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 586 ('933) (dissenting).
12 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 114 (1934).
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II
The main stuff of contemporary Supreme Court litigation is
fairly indicated by the fact that both the first and the last opinions
written by Mr. Justice Cardozo arose out of the interaction of
government and business. Nor does it urge significance unduly
to note that in his first opinion " Cardozo spoke only for himself,
Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone, while his last opin-
ion,"4 announced in his absence by the Chief Justice, was on behalf
of a majority of the Court. The economic and social context of
Cardozo's period of service, the spate of legislation which came
from Congress and the states, and the resistances to which it gave
rise, are too familiar to call even for summary.
Since Chiskoln v. Georgia," Supreme Court decisions have on
occasion furnished materials for popular discussion. But never
in our history was interest in the Court so continuous nor were its
opinions so extensively canvassed in the lay press as during the
incumbency of Cardozo. To a very considerable degree, there-
fore, his opinions have become common property. This is not the
place for their detailed review. A conspectus of his attitude to-
ward the subjection of economic legislation to judicial review must
suffice.
The radiations of taxation have steadily extended the intrusion
of government into econoric affairs. The tasks of statesmanship
in tapping new sources of revenue without killing the goose that
lays the golden eggs have correspondingly multiplied. The enor-
mous diversity in types of business activity, the nice calculations
involved in making classifications at once fair and effective, the
repercussions of different taxes upon diverse enterprises are
among the most exigent but elusive riddles for those charged with
governing. Clich6s like "scientific taxation " cover up a thousand
perplexities not susceptible of solution by procedures and criteria
familiar to the natural sciences. It is in this perspective of per-
vasive fiscal needs and the intractable problems they present to
23 Coombes v. Getz, 283 U. S. 434, 448 (1932) (dissenting).
14 Smyth v. United States, 302 U. S. 329 (1937).
15 2 Dallas 419 (U. S. 1793).
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legislators, that tax measures must be seen when brought under
the scrutiny of such large phrases as "due process" and "the
equal protection of the laws ":
"A tax upon the receipts of a business is not invalid as of course be-
cause some forms of business are hit and others are exempt. To bring
about that result the assailant of the tax must be able to satisfy the court
that the classification had its origin in nothing better than whim and fan-
tasy. . . This is the heavy burden that the appellant must sustain. Is
it a whimsical and fantastic act to tax foreign fire insurance companies
upon all their net receipts, including those derived from casualty
premiums, when no such tax is imposed upon the receipts of insurance
companies that do a casualty business only? If so, the arbitrary
quality of the division must have its origin in the fact that the ac-
tivities of the one class overlap to some extent the activities of the
other. But plainly there is no rule that overlapping classes can
never be established in the realm of taxation except at the price
of an infringement of the federal constitution. The recognition of
such a rule means that a department store may not be taxed on the net
receipts of its business unless all the many activities thus brought under
a single roof are taxed in the same way when separately conducted ...
There must be a tax on the business of the draper, the jeweler, the shoe-
maker, the hatter, the carpet dealer and what not. For the same reason
the proprietor of a retail market dealing in meats and groceries and vege-
tables and fruits will then escape, at least proportionately, a tax upon
receipts if the statute does not cover the business of the shopkeeper who
derives a modest income from the sale of peanuts and bananas. There
.are few taxes upon earnings that would pass so fine a sieve. The rule,
if there is any, against the creation of overlapping classes for purposes of
taxation is manifestly not one of general validity. The range of its ap-
plication must depend upon the facts." I
"The rule is elementary that a state in adopting a system of taxation
is not confined to a formula of rigid uniformity. . . . It may tax some
kinds of property at one rate, and others at another, and exempt others
altogether. . . . It may lay an excise on the operations of a particular
kind of business, and exempt some other kind of business closely akin
thereto. . . . What is true of division into classes according to subject
matter must be true of division into classes dependent upon time. The
temporal arrangement must have its origin, to be sure, in something more
16 Concordia Ins. Co. v. Iliois, 292 U. S. 535, 554-55 (1934) (di&enting).
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than . . . a tyrannical exhibition of arbitrary power. If that re-
proach has been avoided, the classification does not fail because the
burdens before and after are not always and everywhere in perfect
equilibrium.
"From all this it follows that a distinction between wills or deeds
effective before 1907 and those effective afterwards- the exercise or
non-exercise of powers under instruments of the first class giving rise to
a succession to be taxed as a bequest from the donee, and the exercise or
non-exercise of powers under instruments of the second class to be taxed
as a bequest from the donor -is not rooted in caprice. The point of
time which separates the classes is not interjected arbitrarily or by an
exertion of brute force, but corresponds to the behests of a rational taxon-
omy. . . . A legislature cannot be expected in drafting legislation to
think out every conceivable situation in which the members of one class
will bear a heavier burden than the members of another . .. Eccen-
tricities of incidence are common, and perhaps inevitable, in every system
of taxation. The future would have to be scanned with microscopical
powers of vision to foresee and forestall every possible diversity. For
present purposes it is enough that the order of events removes the stigma
of caprice from a system of classification whereby donees of a power be-
fore the passage of the act are treated as grantors, the tax to be laid upon
that basis, whereas donors of a power are recognized as the source of the
succession in respect of transfers afterwards." 17
Taxation primarily for revenue can hardly exclude social con-
sequences. The complexities of tax legislation are intensified
whenever social policy is its predominant aim. From the day of
Hamilton's Report on Manufactures, American statesmen have
employed taxation for purposes other than revenue. Beginning
with Theodore Roosevelt's administration, taxation has assumed a
mounting share in the process of social adjustment. "A motive
to build up through legislation the quality of men," Cardozo was
allowed to say for a narrow majority of the Court, "may be as
creditable in the thought of some as a motive to magnify the
quantity of trade. Courts do not choose between such values in
adjudging legislative powers. They put the choice aside as be-
yond their lawful competence. . . . The tax now assailed may
have its roots in an erroneous conception of the ills of the body
17 Binney v. Long, 299 U. S. 280, 297-99 (1936) (dissenting).
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politic or of the efficacy of such a measure to bring about a cure.
We have no thought in anything we have written to declare it ex-
pedient or even just, or for that matter to declare the contrary.
We deal with power only." I8
Thus, various forms of exaction have been devised as one re-
sponse to the problems presented by economic concentration.
Whether to differentiate between big and smaller business, and
how to do so - these are questions which divide expert as well as
lay opinion. It is not disrespectful for a lawyer to suggest that
this is a realm of public finance in which the fog of doubt and con-
fusion has not yet been wholly lifted by economists. That never-
theless this is a field into which the state may enter no one will
deny. And yet there is no legal litmus to give ready answers when
state action is challenged. Again the ultimate canons for consti-
tutional construction must do service. The Constitution does not
have preferences between competing theories, and the wide range
of discretion which this leaves to the legislative judgment must
not be curtailed by judicial intrusion, under the guise of abstract
absolutes, into the domain of policy. By Cardozo these generali-
ties were translated into living practice. For he viewed measures
of social taxation with a shrewd eye for actuality undiverted by
hypothesized unrealities:
" Statistics .. .indicate that there is a definite line of cleavage be-
tween chains that serve consumers within a single territorial unit and
those framed for larger ends. The business that keeps at home affects
the social organism in ways that differ widely from those typical of a
business that goes out into the world. It affects the social organism, but
also it affects itself. With the lengthening of the chain there are new
fields to be exploited. The door is open to opportunities that have
hitherto been closed. Where does the local have an end and the non-
local a beginning? The legislature had to draw the line somewhere, and
it drew it with the county. Within the range of reasonable discretion
its judgment must prevail.
". .. Lawmakers are not required to legislate with an eye to excep-
tional conditions. Their search is for probabilities and tendencies of
general validity, and these being ascertained, they may frame their rule
accordingly. They are not required to legislate with an eye to forms
Is Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87, 1o-o (1939).
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of growth beyond the limits of their own state. In laying a tax upon a
Florida chain their concern is with those activities that have social and
economic consequences for Florida and her people. The question for
them, and so for us, is not how a business might be expected to develop
if its forms and lines of growth were to be predicted in the abstract with-
out reference to experience. The question is how it does develop in
normal or average conditions, and the answer to that question is to be
found in life and history.
". .. It will not do to shut one's eyes to the motive that has led so
many legislatures to lay hold of this difference [between integrated and
voluntary chains] and turn it into a basis for a new system of taxation.
The system has had its origin in the belief that the social utility or in-
utility of one group is less or greater than that of others, and that the
choice of subjects to be taxed should be adjusted to social gains and losses.
Courts would be lacking in candor if they were not to concede the pres-
ence of such a motive behind this chain store legislation. But a purpose
to bear more heavily on one class than another will not avail without
more to condemn a tax as void. . . . We must know why the discrim-
ination is desired, to what end it is directed and the relation between end
and means. If the motive is vindictiveness, ensuing in mere oppression,
the result may be one thing. If the motive and the end attained are the
advancement of the public good, the result may be quite another, unless
preference and repression go so far as to outrun the bounds of reason.
The legislature has determined with the approval of the court that an
integrated chain is a taxable class separable from independent dealers
and even from chains that are merely co~perative leagues. If these dif-
ferences suffice to establish a basis for distinction between a tax and none
at all, smaller differences may suffice for the graduation of the scale,
The legislature has found them in those variations of degree that separate
a chain within the territorial unit of the locality from chains that are
reaching out for wider fields of power. There is no need to approve or
disapprove the concept of utility or inutility reflected in such laws ...
The concept may be right or wrong. At least it corresponds to an intel-
ligible belief, and one widely prevalent today among honest men and
women. . . . With that our function ends." 19
The bite of a tax case, as of a tax measure, is in its particular
circumstances. Fair-sounding generalities too often shelter con-
crete evasions of them. And so, only detailed analysis of a tax
19 Liggett Co. v. Lde, 288 U. S. 517, 581-86 (1933) (dissenting),
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like that involved in Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis ' - its eco-
nomic setting, its practical operations, and the hopes and fears
that it expressed - could give an adequate critique of the mean-
ing of the decision, of its relation to antecedent authorities and of
the clash of intellectual procedures which, from the same prece-
dents and precepts, drew opposite conclusions. Cardozo's dissent
in this case has such organic unity that one can hardly avoid
mutilation in brief excerpts:
The prevailing opinion commits the court to a holding that a tax
upon gross sales, if laid upon a graduated basis, is always and inevitably
a denial of the equal protection of the laws, no matter how slight the
gradient or moderate the tax ...
"The question then is whether there is rationality in the belief that
capacity to pay increases, by and large, with an increase of receipts.
Certain it is that merchants have faith in such a correspondence and act
upon that faith ...
". .. Larger and larger sales are sought for by business and sought
for with avidity. They are not the products of whim and fancy. They
represent a conception of probabilities and tendencies confirmed by long
experience. The conception is no more arbitrary in the brain of a govern-
ment official than it is in the mind of a company director ...
" The framers of a system of taxation may properly give heed to con-
venience of administration, and in the search for that good may content
themselves with rough and ready compromises. Elaborate machinery,
designed to bring about a perfect equilibrium between benefit and burden,
may at times defeat its aim through its own elaboration. A crippling
result of the decision just announced will be to restrict the choice of
means within bounds unreasonably narrow. Hereafter in the taxation
of business a legislature will be confined, it seems, to an income or profit
tax if it wishes to establish a graduated system proportioning burden to
capacity. But profits themselves are not susceptible of ascertainment
with certainty and precision except as the result of inquiries too minute
to be practicable. The returns of the taxpayer call for an exercise of
judgment as well as for a transcript of the figures on his books. They are
subject to possible inaccuracies, almost without number. Salaries of
superintendents, figuring as expenses, may have been swollen inordi-
nately; appraisals of plant, of merchandise, of patents, of what not, may
be erroneous or even fraudulent. . . . These difficulties and dangers
20 294 U. S. 550 (1935).
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bear witness to the misfortune of forcing methods of taxation within a
Procrustean formula. If the state discerns in business operations uni-
formities and averages that seem to point the way to a system easier to
administer than one based upon a report of profits, and yet likely in the
long run to work out approximate equality, it ought not to be denied
the power to frame its laws accordingly.
" For answer to all this the thrust will not avail that ' it is difficult to
be just and easy to be arbitrary.' The derogatory epithet assumes the
point to be decided. There is nothing arbitrary in rescuing a vast body
of taxpayers from the labor and expense of preparing elaborate reports,
at best approximately accurate. There is nothing arbitrary in rescuing
a government from the labor and expense of setting up the huge and
unwieldy machinery of an income tax department with a swarm of in-
vestigators and accountants and legal and financial experts. To frame
a system of taxation in avoidance of evils such as these is no act of sheer
oppression, no abandonment of reason, no exercise of the general will in
a perverse or vengeful spirit." 21
A healthy society is as much dependent upon wise price policies
as upon sound systems of taxation. But the puzzles of a proper
price mechanism are perhaps even less amenable to unequivocal
solutions than are ways for achieving appropriate fiscal measures.
The operation of pricing schemes in the market is very different
from what it appears to be in economic treatises. Not the least of
these perplexities is the influence of governmental intervention in
pricing. It is more than sixty years since the Supreme Court gave
sanction to price regulation within the limited field of "public
callings." 22  Yet even within this circumscribed field confusion
and friction, with resulting waste, have been more prominent than
agreement on procedure and criteria for fixing values and rates.
2
1
But in this area of government no less than in that of taxation,
legislation cannot wait for accord among economists or general ac-
ceptance of their theories. Powerful economic forces produce
problems which must be dealt with by legislators with whatever
fallible and tentative wisdom they can utilize. The competing
21 Id. at 566-77.
22 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 123 (2877); cf. dLssent of Holmes, J., in Tyson &
Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 445 (1927).
23 See FRANKFURTER, Tim PuBLIc AND ITS GOVMNMNT (1930) Lecture III,
p. 8i.
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claims of consumers and producers, of large producers and small,
of large consumers and small, of producers and distributors, of
distributors and consumers, press for adjustment. Fallible wis-
dom produces fallible legislation. To deny government the right
to act except with omniscience and prescience is to deny it the
right to act at all.
The right to act is evolving empirically and waveringly."4 In
dealing with these new exertions of governmental power, as where
he concerned himself with novel methods of taxation, Cardozo
found his bearings in loyal adherence to the classic doctrines for
constitutional adjudication. He sharply differentiated the austere
responsibility of a judge from the ample discretion of the legisla-
tor. He found no barriers to legislative recognition of differences
among different industries or among different groups within the
same industry; he found no warrant for any doctrine that af-
forded greater immunity to the price mechanisms of industry than
to its other aspects.
That the requirement of due process raises no barrier to price-
fixing where "the conditions or practices of an industry" jus-
tify such a regulatory system was apparently established in
Nebbia's 2_ case. But two years later the provisions of the Guffey
Act " foundered on the rock of inseparability against the protest
of the Chief Justice and that of Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, JJ..T
This impressive minority found the price controls separable from
the rest of the Act and as such within the doctrine of Nebbia's
case. That a single decision, reached by a slender majority in a
strongly contested field, does not guarantee security for a doctrine,
is illustrated by the need which Cardozo felt to argue the legisla-
tive power of price-fixing under circumstances like those presented
by the record in the Carter case.
Referring to "the conditions and practices" found in Neb-
24 See Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the Octo-
ber Terms, 1935 and 1936 (1938) .5 HARv. L. REv. 577, 633-37.
25 Nebbia v. New York, 29i U. S. 502 (1934).
26 The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 991.
27 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (x936). The separate opinion of the
Chief Justice appears at 317. Mr. Justice Cardozo spoke for Brandeis and Stone, JJ.,
as well as for himself, at 324.
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bia's case to justify price-fixing in the New York milk industry,
Cardozo proceeded:
"All this may be said, and with equal, if not greater force, of the
conditions and practices in the bituminous coal industry, not only at the
enactment of this statute in August, 1935, but for many years before.
Overproduction was at a point where free competition had been degraded
into anarchy. Prices had been cut so low that profit had become im-
possible for all except the lucky handful. Wages came down along with
prices and with profits. There were strikes, at times nation-wide in ex-
tent, at other times spreading over broad areas and many mines with the
accompaniment of violence and bloodshed and misery and bitter feeling.
The sordid tale is unfolded in many a document and treatise. During
the twenty-three years between 1913 and 1935, there were nineteen in-
vestigations or hearings by Congress or by specially created commissions
with reference to conditions in the coal mines. The hope of betterment
was faint unless the industry could be subjected to the compulsion of a
code. In the weeks immediately preceding the passage of this Act the
country was threatened once more with a strike of ominous proportions.
The plight of the industry was not merely a menace to owners and to mine
workers: it was and had long been a menace to the public, deeply con-
cerned in a steady and uniform supply of a fuel so vital to the national
economy.
" Congress was not condemned to inaction in the face of price wars
and wage wars so pregnant with disaster. Commerce had been choked
and burdened; its normal flow had been diverted from one state to an-
other; there had been bankruptcy and waste and ruin alike for capital
and for labor. The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment does not
include the right to persist in this anarchic riot. . . . The free compe-
tition so often figured as a social good imports order and moderation and
a decent regard for the welfare of the group. . . . There is testimony in
these records, testimony even by the assailants of the statute, that only
through a system of regulated prices can the industry be stabilized and
set upon the road of orderly and peaceful progress. . . . After making
every allowance for difference of opinion as to the most efficient cure,
the student of the subject is confronted with the indisputable truth that
there were ills to be corrected, and ills that had a direct relation to the
maintenance of commerce among the states without friction or diversion.
An evil existing, and also the power to correct it, the lawmakers were at
liberty to use their own discretion in the selection of the means." 2
28 298 U. S. at 330-32.
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Never was judicial utterance more felicitously chosen than
when Marshall characterized the power of courts to sit in judg-
ment upon legislatures as a "delicate" function. How fine the
threads by which the Supreme Court weaves its share in the tex-
ture of government is beautifully illustrated by the series of cases
in which the Court passed upon the New York Milk Control Act.
In Nebbia's case, as we have seen, the Court over vigorous protest
found no restraint in the Federal Constitution against fixing the
selling price of milk. In the same year the Court sustained an
order under the New York statute, fixing a minimum price to be
paid to producers as well as a minimum resale price, against the
claim of a dealer that under this order he would be operating at
a loss.29 "The appellant's grievance amounts to this," wrote Mr.
Justice Cardozo for the Court, "that it is operating at a loss,
though other dealers more efficient or economical or better known
to the public may be operating at a profit." Little indulgence
was given to such a grievance. "The Fourteenth Amendment
does not protect a business against the hazards of competition."
In Borden's Co. v. Ten Eyck 3 the Court, again dividing as it did
in Nebbia's case, sustained a subordinate feature of the New York
milk control system allowing a differential in the selling price of
milk between dealers who had and dealers who did not have well-
advertised trade names. The very same day a majority of the
Court declared invalid another provision of the New York Act dis-
criminating between milk dealers without well-advertised trade
names who were in the business before April io, 1933, and those
in that class who entered it later."- Against this conclusion
Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, JJ., entered dissent. How tenuous
was the margin of difference between these cases is attested by
the robust sentence opening Cardozo's dissenting opinion: "The
judgment just announced is irreconcilable in principle with the
judgment in Borden's case, ante, p. 251, announced a minute or
so earlier." "
The whole of Cardozo's closely-knit dissent in this case illus-
29 Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. x63 (1934).
30 Id. at 17o.
31 297 U. S. 251 (1936).
32 Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266 (1936). 33 Id. at -74.
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trates the treacherous appearance of law given to issues essentially
of fact that come before the Court for judgment under the due
process clauses. It also illustrates the rigor with which Cardozo
pursued the Holmesian tradition of not allowing questions of de-
gree, however close, to be elevated into constitutional principles:
"A minimum price for fluid milk was fixed by law in April, 1933. At
that time, ' independents ' were underselling their competitors, the deal-
ers in well-advertised brands, by approximately a cent a quart. There
was reason to believe that unless that differential was preserved, they
would be driven out of business. To give them an opportunity to stir-
vive, the lawmakers maintained the differential in the City of New York,
the field of keenest competition. We have learned from the opinion in
Borden's case that this might lawfully be done.
"The problem was then forced upon the lawmakers, what were to be
the privileges of independents who came upon the scene thereafter? . . .
"Hardships, great or little, were inevitable, whether the field of the
differential was narrowed or enlarged. The legislature, and not the court,
has been charged with the duty of determining their comparative extent.
. . . In declaring the equities of newcomers to be not inferior to those
of others, the judgment makes a choice between competing considera-
tions of policy and fairness, however emphatic its professions that it
applies a rule of law.
"For the situation was one to tax the wisdom of the wisest. At the
very least it was a situation where thoughtful and honest men might see
their duty differently ...
".. . It is juggling with words to say that all the independents make
up a single ' class,' and by reason of that fact must be subjected to a
single rule. Whether the class is divisible into subclasses is the very
question to be answered. There may be division and subdivision unless
separation can be found to be so void of rationality as to be the expression
of a whim rather than an exercise of judgment. . . . On this occasion,
happily, the facts are not obscure. Big dealers and little ones, newcomers
in the trade and veterans, were clamorously asserting to the legislature
their title to its favor. I have not seen the judicial scales so delicately
poised and so accurately graduated as to balance and record the subtleties
of all these rival equities, and make them ponderable and legible beyond
a reasonable doubt.
"To say that the statute is not void beyond a reasonable doubt is to
say that it is valid." 14
34 Id. at 275-78.
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The ample scope which Cardozo thus gave to legislative discre-
tion in devising policy did not make him indifferent to those pro-
cedural safeguards in the exercise of governmental powers which
give historic basis to " due process." " Prices may be fixed
and profits limited, certainly for the "public callings," but not
without fair inquiry and an adequate canvass of the factors rele-
vant to adjustment between private and public interests:
"The fundamentals of a trial were denied to the appellant when rates
previously collected were ordered to be refunded upon the strength of
evidential facts not spread upon the record.
" The Commission had given notice that the value of the property
would be fixed as of a date certain. . . . Without warning or even the
hint of warning that the case would be considered or determined upon
any other basis than the evidence submitted, the Commission cut down
the values for the years after the date certain upon the strength of in-
formation secretly collected and never yet disclosed. The company pro-
tested. It asked disclosure of the documents indicative of price trends,
and an opportunity to examine them, to analyze them, to explain and
rebut them. The response was a curt refusal. Upon the strength of
these unknown documents refunds have been ordered for sums mounting
into millions, the Commission reporting its conclusion, but not the under-
lying proofs. The putative debtor does not know the proofs today. This
is not the fair hearing essential to due process. It is condemnation with-
out trial." z
The accomplishments of half a century have won for the Inter-
state Commerce Commission a place in the Supreme Court's es-
teem not second to that accorded the lower federal courts. Mr.
Justice Cardozo gave voice to that esteem:
"The structure of a rate schedule calls in peculiar measure for the use of
that enlightened judgment which the Commission by training and ex-
perience is qualified to form. . . . It is not the province of a court to
absorb this function to itself. . . . The judicial function is exhausted
35 Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term " Liberty" in Those Clauses in the
Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property"
(1S91) 4 1Av. L. RmV. 365.
36 Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Comm., 301 U. S. 292, 300 (1937).
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when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved
by the administrative body. In this instance the care and patience with
which the Commission fulfilled its appointed tasks are plain, even to the
casual reader, upon the face of its report." "1
But the very complexity of the technical tasks entrusted to such
a commission led to the requirement that it formulate the basis of
its determinations. This is the justification for findings, that they
serve to illumine and thereby to safeguard the Commission's own
procedures. It was not in the spirit of Baron Parke that Cardozo
spoke for the Court in vindicating the rationale of findings:
"We would not be understood as saying that there do not lurk in this
report phrases or sentences suggestive of a different meaning. One gains
at places the impression that the Commission looked upon the proposed
reduction as something more than a disruptive tendency; that it found
unfairness in the old relation of parity between Brazil and Springfield;
and that the new schedule in its judgment would confirm Milwaukee in
the enjoyment of an undue proportion of the traffic. The difficulty is
that it has not said so with the simplicity and clearness through which a
halting impression ripens into reasonable certitude. In the end we are
left to spell out, to argue, to choose between conflicting inferences ...
We must know wbat a decision means before the duty becomes ours to
say whether it is right or wrong." 18
But insistence on procedural regularity was not, for Cardozo,
an expression of inhospitality to the process behind the develop-
ment of administrative law. Nor did he see administrative law as
a collection of explicit rules uniformly applicable throughout the
domain of what the British call " delegated legislation." Cardozo
recognized that the broad concepts of hearing, findings and judi-
cial review summarized a variety of diversified situations in which
the large aims expressed by these concepts were variously
achieved:
"We are not unmindful of cases in which the word ' hearing ' as ap-
plied to administrative proceedings has been thought to have a broader
meaning. All depends upon the context. . . . The answer will not be
37 Mississippi Valley Barge Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. 282, 286-87 (x934).
38 United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 294 U. S. 499, 510-11 (1935).
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found in definitions of a hearing lifted from their setting and then applied
to new conditions. The answer will be found in a consideration of the
ends to be achieved in the particular conditions that were expected or
foreseen. To know what they are, there must be recourse to all the aids
available in the process of construction, to history and analogy and
practice as well as to the dictionary." 30
Cardozo had, if not Maitland's genius, the latter's perception
of the social forces that mold law."0 He had, to be sure, an enor-
mous fund of technical learning. But he escaped that dangerous
narrowness of the mere legal pedant which has been the subject of
classic animadversions by Burke 4 ' and Bagehot."2 He did so by
seeing law as part of our whole cultural history. Cardozo was not
imprisoned by the tags and rags of learning, for he was guided by
understanding of the circumstances summarized in historic clichts
and by philosophic insight into their significance. Thus he never
forgot that forms are related to functions; that court procedures
not expressive of ultimate liberties are not necessarily norms of
universal applicability; that practices of administration may have
a momentum of rationality; and that activities of government
which are not the immediate province of courts ought not to be
circumscribed by formalities historically appropriate to courts."
He used his learning in technical law not as the standard for judg-
ment of allowable development in new branches of the law, but as
a fertile source for proving that old principles have creative ener-
gies for new situations."
Thus viewing administrative law, Cardozo eschewed unreal ab-
stractions 45 and stuck close to the practicalities of government as
39 Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 3,7 (1933) (dealing
with procedure of the Tariff Commision under the Revenue Act of 1922).
40 Cf. Iw.wAr D, CosmTr oNoA. HISTORY OF ENGL1D (x913) 415 et seq.
41 See Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, 2 BURKE, WorEs (3d ed. x869) 196 el seq.
42 See Bagehot's portrait of Lord Eldon in The First Edinburgh Re ,iwers in 2
BAEIN2GToN, WoRxs AND Lirs or WArrzm BAGEOr (1915) 56 et seq.
43 United States v. Henry Prentiss & Co., 288 U. S. 73 (1933); Bemis Bro. Bag
Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 28 (1933).
4 See Bemis Bro. Bag. Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 28, 33 (1933).
45 " Abstraction, though necessary to thought, is liable to be the death of it.
It lures the more guileless of its devotees into solemn futilities.. . .1 R. H. Tawney,
Book Review (1938) 16 T E NEW STATESmA_ AND NATixo (us.) 880-82.
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revealed by history, by legislative ends and administrative re-
sponsibilities:
"The opinion of the court reminds us of the dangers that wait upon
the abuse of power by officialdom unchained. The warning is so fraught
with truth that it can never be untimely. But timely too is the reminder,
as a host of impoverished investors would be ready to attest, that there
are dangers in untruths and half truths when certificates masquerading
as securities pass current in the market. There are dangers in spreading
a belief that untruths and half truths, designed to be passed on for the
guidance of confiding buyers, are to be ranked as peccadillos, or even
perhaps as part of the amenities of business. When wrongs such as these
have been committed or attempted, they must be dragged to light and
pilloried. To permit an offending registrant to stifle an inquiry by pre-
cipitate retreat on the eve of his exposure is to give immunity to guilt;
to encourage falsehood and evasion; to invite the cunning and unscrupu-
lous to gamble with detection. If withdrawal without leave may check
investigation before securities have been issued, it may do as much there-
after, unless indeed consistency be thrown to the winds, for by the teach-
ing of the decision withdrawal without leave is equivalent to a stop order,
with the result that forthwith there is nothing to investigate. The statute
and its sanctions became the sport of clever knaves.
"Appeal is vaguely made to some constitutional immunity, whether
express or implied is not stated with distinctness. . . . If the immunity
rests upon some express provision of the Constitution, the opinion of the
court does not point us to the article or section. If its source is to be
found in some impalpable essence, the spirit of the Constitution or the
philosophy of government favored by the Fathers, one may take leave
to deny that there is anything in that philosophy or spirit whereby the
signer of a statement filed with a regulatory body to induce official action
is protected against inquiry into his own purpose to deceive. The argu-
ment for immunity lays hold of strange analogies. A Commission which
is without coercive powers, which cannot arrest or amerce or imprison
though a crime has been uncovered, or even punish for contempt, but
can only inquire and report, the propriety of every question in the course
of the inquiry being subject to the supervision of the ordinary courts of
justice, is likened with denunciatory fervor to the Star Chamber of the
Stuarts. Historians may find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile." 40
46 Jones v. SEC, 298 U. S. 1, 32-33 (1936) (dissenting).
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IV
In the domain of economic affairs, the penumbral region where
law and policy blend, Cardozo walked humbly. But when those
ethical precepts which are embodied in the Bill of Rights were
invoked, he responded with all the certitude of one whose most
constant companion was reason and whose life was rooted in the
moral law. Unfortunately, the brevity of his tenure and the con-
tingencies upon which the assignment of opinions depends gave
him only limited opportunity in Washington to express with new
vitality the claims of civilization expressed by constitutional pro-
tection to civil liberties. Doubtless his presence on the Court,
particularly in these matters, made itself felt otherwise than
through his own opinions. For, while the conferences in Washing-
ton could hardly have had for Cardozo the intimate camaraderie
which so gladdened his days at Albany, the contagion of his ethical
qualities must have affected the currents of his newer associations.
To trace such influences upon the actions and opinions of others
is, however, too elusive a pursuit for one outside the inner mys-
teries of the Court.
We do not therefore have in his Supreme Court opinions such
full-bodied expression of his philosophy of spiritual freedom as
that which opportunities enabled Holmes to add to our permanent
literature." Happily, however, he wrote on the great theme of
47 Friendly critics have suggested that Cardozo viewed encroachments upon
civil liberties with less deference to the legislative judgment than that which he
accorded to economic measures. The same seeming inconsistency has been suggested
against Holmes, and the answer made in Holmes' case applies to Cardozo as well:
"The justice deferred so abundantly to legislative judgment on economic policy
because he was profoundly aware of the extent to which social arrangements are
conditioned by time and circumstances, and of how fragile, in scientific proof, is the
ultimate validity of a particular economic adjustment. He knew that there was no
authoritative fund of social wisdom to be drawn upon for answers to the perplexities
which vast new material resources had brought. And so he was hesitant to op-
pose his own opinion to the economic views of the legislature. But history bad also
taught him that, since social development is a process of trial and error, the fullest
possible opportunity for the free play of the human mind was an indispensable pre-
requisite. Since the history of civilization is in considerable measure the displace-
ment of error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have
yielded to other truths, the liberty of man to search for truth was of a different
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the freedom of the human mind in perduring language to which
not even an opinion could have added intrinsic authority:
"Many an appeal to freedom is the masquerade of privilege or inequality
seeking to intrench itself behind the catchword of a principle. There
must be give and take at many points, allowance must be made for the
play of the machine, or in the clash of jarring rivalries the pretending
absolutes will destroy themselves and ordered freedom too. Only in one
field is compromise to be excluded, or kept within the narrowest limits.
There shall be no compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and
speak them, except at those extreme borders where thought merges into
action. There is to be no compromise here, for thought freely com-
municated, if I may borrow my own words, is the indispensable condition
of intelligent experimentation, the one test of its validity. There is no
freedom without choice, and there is no choice without knowledge
or none that is not illusory. Here are goods to be conserved, however
great the seeming sacrifice. We may not squander the thought that will
be the inheritance of the ages." 48
In at least one case -the last opinion he delivered in person
he had to consider judicially the scope of the civil liberties pro-
tected by the Constitution. He did so in order to discover a" uni-
fying principle," if possible, in those cases in which the Bill of
Rights or its embodiment in the Fourteenth Amendment had
been invoked. It is a superb example of his strict adherence to
the common-law tradition - especially important in constitu-
tional controversies - of dealing with the concrete case, but deal-
ing with it not in the shallow belief that a case is a discrete phe-
order than some economic dogma defined as a sacred right because the temporal
nature of its origin had been forgotten. And without freedom of expression, liberty
of thought is a mockery. Nor can truth be pursued in an atmosphere hostile to the
endeavor or under dangers which only heroes hazard.
"Naturally, therefore, Mr. Justice Holmes attributed very different legal signifi-
cance to those liberties of the individual which history has attested as the indis-
pensabIe conditions of a free society from that which he attached to liberties which
derived merely from shifting economic arrangements. . . . Because these civil
liberties were explicitly safeguarded in the Constitution or conceived to be basic
to any notion of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice
Holmes was far more ready to find legislative invasion in this field than in the area
of debatable economic reform." FRANxFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SU-
PREME CO'RT (X938) 50-51.
4S Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes (x93z) 44 HARV. L. REv. 682, 687-88.
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nomenon having neither genealogy nor offspring, but in the vivid
awareness that the specific inevitably implicates principles and
premises:
"The exclusion of these immunities and privileges [in cases cited] from
the privileges and immunities protected against the action of the states
has not been arbitrary or casual. It has been dictated by a study and
appreciation of the meaning, the essential implications, of liberty itself.
"We reach a different plane of social and moral values when we pass
to the privileges and immunities that have been taken over from the
earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought within the Four-
teenth Amendment by a process of absorption. These in their origin
were effective against the federal government alone. If the Fourteenth
Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption has had its
source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed. . . This is true, for illustration, of freedom of thought,
and speech. Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the in-
dispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare
aberrations a pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in our
history, political and legal. So it has come about that the domain of
liberty, withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment by
the states, has been enlarged by latter-day judgments to include liberty
of the mind as well as liberty of action. The extension became, indeed,
a logical imperative when once it was recognized, as long ago it was, that
liberty is something more than exemption from physical restraint, and
that even in the field of substantive rights and duties the legislative judg-
ment, if oppressive and arbitrary, may be overridden by the courts." '9
Human interests of such dignity he would not imprison in the
subtle meshes of procedural technicality. He was alert against
the dangers of concessions in principle but attritions in practice.
"A system of procedure is perverted from its proper function
when it multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant of
clear necessity." 'o Thus he wrote in a little case between man
and man. Naturally, therefore, this master of procedure refused
to be hobbled by the Court's contrivances for the orderly pres-
entation of appeals, when a vital issue of freedom of speech ap-
peared from the record as clearly and as opportunely as the
49 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 326-27 (1937).
ro Reed v. Alien, 286 U. S. X9i, 209 (1932) (dissenting).
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strange circumstances of the Herndon case 11 permitted. Again,
no one knew better than he the rational limits of our system of
evidence, but he also knew the reaches of its utility in protecting
life from human caprice and fallibility. Consequently he was
alert against the risks of overrefinement in rules to be applied by
the men and women who sit in the jury-box, particularly when life
is in the balance. -
Civil liberties were for Cardozo not empty slogans but cherished
protections of the human spirit. They derived meaning from his-
tory and were given pertinence by contemporary society. He
was, however, too steeped in the history of the law not to detect
quickly meretricious uses of history. By seeing decisions like
that in Bushell's case in their setting, he adhered to a principle
without distorting it to alien purposes. 3 And so he never rested
51 "I hold the view that the protection of the Constitution was seasonably
invoked and that the court should proceed to an adjudication of the merits. Where
the merits lie I do not now consider, for in the view of the majority the merits are
irrelevant. My protest is confined to the disclaimer of jurisdiction ...
"What was brought into the case on the motion of rehearing was a standard
wholly novel, the expectancy of life to be ascribed to the persuasive power of an
idea. The defendant had no opportunity in the state court to prepare his argument
accordingly. He had no opportunity to argue from the record that guilt was not
a reasonable inference or one permitted by the Constitution, on the basis of that
test any more than on the basis of others discarded as unfitting .... The argument
thus shut out is submitted to us now. Will men 'judging in calmnez' . . . say of
the defendant's conduct as shown forth in the pages of this record that it was an
attempt to stir up revolution through the power of his persuasion and within the
time when that persuasion might be expected to endure? If men so judging will say
yes, will the Constitution of the United States uphold a reading of the statute that
will lead to that response? Those are the questions that the defendant lays before
us after conviction of a crime punishable by death in the discretion of the jury. I
think he should receive an answer." Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441, 447, 454-55
(1935) (dissenting).
52 "Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds.
The reverberating clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker sound.
It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are
framed. They have their source very often in considerations of administrative con-
venience, of practical expediency, and not in rules of logic. When the risk of con-
fusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out."
Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 2o4 (2933).
"3 " Nothing in our decision impairs the authority of Busldl's case, Vaughan
135, 167o, with its historic vindication of the privilege of jurors to return a verdict
freely according to their conscience. . . . Bushdl's case was born of the fear of the
Star Chamber and of the tyranny of the Stuarts. .... It stands for a great prin-
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on a formula, even one that embodied the most precious victory of
reason. Had Cardozo ever been called upon to vindicate the se-
curity which the Constitution guarantees to "the free exercise"
of religion, he doubtless would have done so in majestic utterance.
But when immunity from compulsory instruction in military
science in a state university sought the shelter of religious liberty,
he rejected the claim sympathetically but robustly:
"The petitioners have not been required to bear arms for any hostile pur-
pose, offensive or defensive, either now or in the future. They have not
even been required in any absolute or peremptory way to join in courses
of instruction that will fit them to bear arms. If they elect to resort to
an institution for higher education maintained with the state's moneys,
then and only then they are commanded to follow courses of instruction
believed by the state to be vital to its welfare. This may be condemned
by some as unwise or illiberal or unfair when there is violence to con-
scientious scruples, either religious or merely ethical. More must be
shown to set the ordinance at naught. . . . Instruction in military
science is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither
directly nor indirectly is government establishing a state religion when it
insists upon such training. Instruction in military science, unaccom-
panied here by any pledge of military service, is not an interference by
the state with the free exercise of religion when the liberties of the con-
stitution are read in the light of a century and a half of history during
days of peace and war." *
V
The constitutional history of our federal system as disclosed in
Supreme Court decisions is in no small measure the still unwritten
story of the rhythm of emphasis now upon national power, now
upon state power. But no period of the Court's life contained
such extreme fluctuations of rhythm within so short a span as the
less than six terms during which Cardozo sat.
Certainly constitutional dialectic has never been employed to
ciple, which is not to be whittled down or sacrificed. On the other hand it is not to
be strained and distorted into fanciful extensions. There is a peril of corruption
in these days which is surely no less than the peril of coercion." Clark v. United
States, 289 U. S. 1, 16-x7 (I933).
5 Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 265-66 (1934) (concurring).
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more self-defeating ends than when a narrow majority of the
Court invoked state sovereignty against the Municipal Bank-
ruptcy Act as a means of destroying the state's freedom of action.
Such a doctrine of impotence, Cardozo protested, was consonant
neither with reason nor with the whole" evolutionary process" of
our constitutional law:
"The question is not here whether the statute would be valid if it
made provision for involuntary bankruptcy, dispensing with the consent
of the state and with that of the bankrupt subdivision. For present
purposes one may assume that there would be in such conditions a dislo-
cation of that balance between the powers of the states and the powers
of the central government which is essential to our federal system ...
The statute now in question does not dislocate the balance. It has been
framed with sedulous regard to the structure of the federal system.
The governmental units of the state may not act under this statute ex-
cept through the medium of a voluntary petition which will evince their
own consent, their own submission to the judicial power. Even that
however is not enough. . . . To cap the protective structure, Texas has
a statute whereby all municipalities, political subdivisions and taxing
districts in the state are empowered to proceed under the challenged Act
of Congress, and to do anything appropriate to take advantage of its
provisions ...
". .. To hold that this purpose [relief for distressed municipalities]
must be thwarted by the courts because of a supposed affront to the dig-
nity of a state, though the state disclaims the affront and is doing all it
can to keep the law alive, is to make dignity a doubtful blessing." r
This conception of the federal system became the law of the land
within two years, for the dissenters in United States v. Bekins 11
were surely justified in their opinion," that the principle approved
in Ashton v. Cameron County District" was controlling in the
Bekins case if that principle had vitality.
Within a year after the Ashton case protected the states from
federal collaboration which they sought, Mr. Justice Cardozo was
permitted to speak for a majority of the Court in sustaining one of
the most ramifying exertions of Federal power. For a hundred
years the implications of the general welfare clause were debated
5 Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U. S. 513, 538-39, 541 (1936).
"6 304 U. S. 27, 54 (1938).
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by publicists and statesmen. The Supreme Court, with wise ab-
stention, avoided this thorny conflict. Excepting only the creative
interpretations of Marshall whereby great national powers were
breathed into the inert words of the Constitution, probably no
other adjudications of the Court initiated such far-reaching recog-
nition of federal authority as that which was given in the Social
Security cases." From such powerful and luminous opinions as
those which Cardozo rendered there, the choice of short excerpts
becomes an invidious necessity:
" Congress may spend money in aid of the 'general welfare.' . ..
The conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton and
strongly reinforced by Story has prevailed over that of Madison, which
has not been lacking in adherents. Yet difficulties are left when the power
is conceded. The line must still be drawn between one welfare and an-
other, between particular and general. Where this shall be placed can-
not be known through a formula in advance of the event. There is a
middle ground, or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large.
The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The discretion
belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbi-
trary power, not an exercise of judgment. . . . Nor is the concept of
the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a cen-
tury ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the Nation.
What is critical or urgent changes with the times.
" The purge of nation-wide calamity that began in 1929 has taught us
many lessons. Not the least is the solidarity of interests that may once
have seemed to be divided. Unemployment spreads from State to State,
the hinterland now settled that in pioneer days gave an avenue of es-
cape. ....
"The problem is plainly national in area and dimensions. Moreover,
laws of the separate states cannot deal with it effectively. Congress,
at least, had a basis for that belief.. .. Only a power that is national
can serve the interests of all.
"Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of benefits set
forth in Title II, it is not for us to say. The answer to such inquiries
must come from Congress, not the courts. Our concern here, as often,
is with power, not with wisdom. Counsel for respondent has recalled to
us the virtues of self-reliance and frugality. There is a possibility, he
57 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 3oI U. S. 548 (1937) ; Helvering v. Davis, 3o
U. S. 61g (i937).
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says, that aid from a paternal government may sap those sturdy virtues
and breed a race of weaklings. If Massachusetts so believes and shapes
her laws in that conviction, must her breed of sons be changed, he asks,
because some other philosophy of government finds favor in the halls of
Congress. But the answer is not doubtful. One might ask with equal
reason whether the system of protective tariffs is to be set aside at will in
one state or another whenever local policy prefers the rule of laissez faire.
The issue is a closed one. It was fought out long ago. When money is
spent to promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the oppo-
site is shaped by Congress, not the states. So the concept be not arbi-
trary, the locality must yield." 58
Cardozo did not deem it necessary to reconcile these cases with
the Butler case,' decided fourteen months earlier, and this is not
the place to make the attempt.
In these phases of our federal system Cardozo dealt with rela-
tively novel issues which gave full play to his learning, imagina-
tion and serene devotion to the ultimate but narrowly confined
function of the Court in assessing the validity of legislation. He
left his special mark in every case he wrote, but when dealing with
the commerce clause he wrote upon a heavily encrusted palimpsest.
In view of the illumination which the Chief Justice has shed upon
the organic relation of modern industry in his opinions in the
Labor Board Cases,"0 the earlier exposition by Cardozo of the rami-
fications of modern industry has become part of the established
corpus of the law of the commerce clause:
"To regulate the price for such transactions is to regulate commerce it-
self, and not alone its antecedent conditions or its ultimate consequences.
The very act of sale is limited and governed. Prices in interstate trans-
actions may not be regulated by the states. . . . They must therefore
be subject to the power of the nation unless they are to be withdrawn
altogether from governmental supervision ...
" Regulation of prices being an exercise of the commerce power
58 Helvering v. Davis, 3oi U. S. 619, 640-41, 644-45 (1937).
59 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. i (1936).
0 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3o U. S. 1 (1937); NLRB v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co., id. at 49; NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., id.
at 58; Associated Press v. NLRB, id. at io3; and Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co.
v. NLRB, id. at 142.
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the question remains whether it comes within that power as applied to
intrastate sales where interstate prices are directly or intimately affected.
...Sometimes it is said that the relation must be 'direct' to bring
that power into play. . . . At times, . . . the waves of causation vll
have radiated so far that their undulatory motion, if discernable at all,
will be too faint or obscure, too broken by cross-currents, to be heeded
by the law. In such circumstances the holding is not directed at prices
or wages considered in the abstract, but at prices or wages in particular
conditions. . . . Always the setting of the facts is to be viewed if one
would know the closeness of the tie. . . . The power is as broad as the
need that evokes it." 61
If he seemed to throw his weight to the side of national power
it was not because of any strong doctrinaire beliefs or political pref-
erences. Thus he decided against New York in one aspect of its
milk control legislation, doubtless with special sympathy for the
difficulties which confronted the state, because he could not escape
the conviction that New York was in effect erecting a barrier
where the commerce clause enjoined free trade:
"What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with
another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation. Formu-
las and catchwords are subordinate to this overmastering requirement.
Neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state
of destination with the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier
against competition with the products of another state or the labor of its
residents. Restrictions so contrived are an unreasonable clog upon the
mobility of commerce. They set up what is equivalent to a rampart of
customs duties designed to neutralize advantages belonging to the place
of origin. . . . The form of the packages in such circumstances is im-
material, whether they are original or broken. The importer must be
free from imposts framed for the very purpose of suppressing compe-
tition from without and leading inescapably to the suppression so in-
tended." 62
These were not matters that closely touched his private intel-
lectual interests. He decided as he decided and wrote what he
01 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 324, 326-28 (1936) (dissenting).
Cf. Mr. justice Cardozo's concurring opinion in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U. S. 499, 551, 554 ('935), where similar views were expre2sed less ex-
plicitly.
62 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 527 (1935) (holding unconstitutional, as a
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wrote because the judicial function as he conceived it and so
candidly set it forth in his philosophic writings compelled his votes
and indicated the direction of his opinions.
To adapt a favorite quotation of his, these extracts are but little
fragments of the golden fleece that Cardozo has left upon the
hedges of his judicial life. But even the fullest reading of his
opinions merely gives intimations of his depth of thought and
beauty of character. The permanent influence of this great judge
was achieved only partially by his own writings, for the current
of his culture permeated in ways more subtle than even his opinions
can express. Perhaps his qualities are best defined by saying that
Cardozo completely satisfied the requirements of a judge wholly
adequate for the Supreme Bench.
"I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon
to pass on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing
acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and
Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machia-
velli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as
with the books which have been specifically written on the subject.
For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he ap-
proaches the questions before him. The words he must construe are
empty vessels into which he can pour nearly anything he will. Men do
not gather figs of thistles, nor supple institutions from judges whose
outlook is limited by parish or class. They must be aware that there are
before them more than verbal problems; more than final solutions cast
in generalizations of universal applicability. They must be aware of
the changing social tensions in every society which make it an organism;




burden on interstate commerce, that portion of the New York Milk Control Act
prohibiting the sale of milk imported from another state if the price paid to the
producer in the other state was less than the minimum price prescribed by New York
for purchases from New York producers). Cf. Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937), upholding the Washington
compensating use tax.
03 L. Hand, Sources of Tolerance (1930) 79 U. oF PA. L. Rav. X, 12.
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